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Abstract 
Both governance theory and social network analysis have much to offer in pointing out the 
important role that governance networks can potentially play in democratizing inter-
governmental policy making. By establishing weak democratic ties between operationally 
autonomous but interdependent democratically appointed governments governance networks 
can promote an effective diffusion of information and influence and some degree of social 
cohesion between them. This specific capacity of governance networks give them an important 
role to play in a much needed democratization of inter-demos policy making as well as in 
reducing the risk of political closure that characterizes intra-demos policy making. However, if 
this democratic potential of governance networks is to be realized, they must be metagoverned 
in ways that construct them as democratic arenas that are called upon to legitimize themselves 
in accordance with a hegemonic democratic myth.       
 
1. Introduction 
Twentieth Century political science and public administration research has documented in 
detail that there is considerable distance between the ideal typical promises of the various 
normative models of representative democracy and their actual functioning in advanced liberal 
democracies (Schumpeter 1975 [1942]; Dahl 1956; Lindblom 1965; Rhodes 1997). 
Nevertheless, representative democracy has maintained its unchallenged and almost mythical 
position as the only acceptable way of institutionalizing liberal democracy. The strength of this 
myth can be explained partly by its simplicity and clarity that offers a consoling sense of order, 
and partly by the fact that we have not yet seen alternative myths that are able to offer the same 
kind of consoling image of what strong democratic institutions look like (Stoker 1998, p. 21). 
Any institutional set up that aims to become recognized as a positive contribution to democracy 
must lean on such a myth. The strength of the prevailing myth is evidenced by the fact that 
despite the documented distance from ideal type to reality the institutions of representative 
democracy prevail: there appears to be no better way of ensuring democracy within a political 
community than though the election of a representative political body, e.g. a government.  
 The myth has, however, proven to be considerably less powerful as a point of reference for 
considerations regarding how to democratically institutionalize the increasing amount of policy 
making that involves more than one democratically elected government (Bohman 2005; Ansell 
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2000; Jessop 2004). This weak point in the myth derives from the fact that most models of 
representative democracy view democracy as a way of organizing decision making within a 
polity and not between polities. Due to this intra-polity approach to democracy, few 
considerations are made regarding how to democratize inter-governmental policy making i.e. 
policy making that involves two or more transnational, national, sub-national or sub-local 
democratically elected representative bodies. Among them count the European Parliament, 
national parliaments, regional and municipal councils, and finally elected city and village 
councils and user boards. As such, a one sided reliance on the model of representative 
democracy produces an institutional void in democracy. Moreover, as pointed out in the 
expanding research on governance and globalization, this void is becoming more and more hard 
felt due to the current growth in inter-governmental policy making (Greven and Pauly 2000; 
Holden 2000; Bache and Flinders 2004; Heffen, Kickert and Thomassen 2000; Kersbergen and 
Waarden 2004; Hajer 2003). Therefore, the question of how to fill the democratic void is 
moving ever higher on the research agenda of political scientists and public administration 
researchers.   
 The aim of this article is to propose that although governance networks challenge 
representative democracy in many ways (Pierre and Peters 2005, p. 118; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2004), they have the potential to become a cornerstone in democratizing inter-governmental 
policy. The democratic potentials of governance networks are directly related to their particular 
form and functioning: they offer an institutional framework that promotes the formulation of 
shared goals and coordinated action in contexts characterized by non-hierarchical relations 
between interdependent but operationally autonomous actors, e.g. governments. Thereby, they 
provide a means to enhance the willingness of governments to commit themselves to inter-
governmental political decisions making on issues of shared importance.  Although the ability 
to promote joint action between governments is not in itself a contribution to democracy, the 
willingness to engage in collective decision making that reaches beyond the individual demos is 
an important precondition for developing inter-governmental forms of democracy. The 
particular democratic contribution of governance networks is that they institutionalize inter-
governmental policy making in ways that do not undermine but supplement and enrich the 
institutional set up and myth that have given representative democracy its hegemonic position 
in advanced liberal democracies. They supplement representative democracy by offering an 
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institutional set up and a powerful myth that encourages governments to pursue joint policy 
making without damaging the links to their respective constituencies. They enrich 
representative democracy by destabilizing the sharp lines that are drawn between the inside and 
outside of democracy and by disturbing well-established power positions and alliances and 
hegemonic policy discourses within the individual demos (Connolly 1995). As such, 
governance networks can be seen as a valuable ingredient in expanding the model of 
representative democracy in ways that, at one and the same time, help to fill the institutional 
void that characterizes the traditional model of representative democracy, and improves its 
ability to live up to its promises.  
 Efforts to clarify the particular value of governance networks in developing an expanded 
model of representative democracy can find valuable inspiration in Mark Granovetter’s (1973) 
famous analysis of the strength of weak ties. This analysis points out how the presence of weak 
ties between groups constituted on strong ties is crucial for ensuring effective societal 
governance because weak ties stimulate an effective diffusion of information and influence and 
some level of social cohesion in contexts characterized by marked differentiation. Although 
Granovetter is more interested in effectiveness than in democracy, and focuses on dyadic 
structures and not on the role and functioning of weak ties between multiple actors, his basic 
argument is also relevant in this context.  Hence, I shall claim that the presence of weak ties 
between governments with strong ties to their constituencies is highly important for two 
reasons. First, the existence of weak ties adds to the diffusion of political information that can 
promote democratic accountability, the diffusion of political influence to those governments 
who are most intensely affected by the decisions made, and the development of a sense of 
shared destiny between them needed to construct them as a momentary or situated ‘we’ or 
demos that can pursue a common good. Second, the existence of weak ties between 
governments paves the way for an inter-governmental political orientation that will reduce the 
permanent danger of intra-demos closure through a disturbance and a reshuffling of existing 
power positions, hegemonic discourses and storylines and political identities.    
 The fact that inter-governmental policy making between elected governments does already 
to a wide extent take place in various types of governance networks further supports the view 
that it is worth while considering the role that governance networks might play in enhancing the 
democratic quality of inter-governmental policy-processes (Fung and Wright 2003; Bogason 
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and Zølner 2007; Slaughter 2003; Marcussen and Torfing 2007; Ansell 2000; Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009; Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). However, as highlighted in the current debate 
among governance theorists,  the surge of governance networks hold promises as well as 
dangers for democracy (Klijn and Skelcher 2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Young 2000; 
Hansen 2007; Dryzek 2007; Pierre and Peters 2005). What we learn from this debate is that 
governance networks are neither intrinsically democratic nor intrinsically undemocratic. 
Moreover, we learn that whether they become the one or the other depends on the degree to 
which they are metagoverned in ways that construct them as democratic arenas (Sørensen and 
Torfing 2005). I define democratic arenas as institutionalized arrangements and myths that put 
pressure on the participating actors: 1) to diffuse influence between the involved parties in ways 
that can be legitimized with reference to the degree to which the participants are affected by the 
decisions that are being made; 2) to develop a sense of shared destiny that makes the 
formulation of shared policy goals possible; and 3) to diffuse information between them in 
ways that make it possible for the participants to hold each other to account.  
After a short description of the institutional void that exists in models of representative 
democracy and the growing concerns that this void gives rise to, follows a brief outline of two 
case studies that illuminate the current need to find ways to enhance the democratic functioning 
and legitimacy of inter-governmental policy making. Then, I point out, in more detail, the 
potential role that governance networks can play in this endeavour and conclude with an outline 
of how a realization of this potential calls for skilful and targeted metagovernance.  
 
2. The institutional void in representative democacy  
Horizontal and vertical forms of inter-governmental policy making have become a frequent and 
integrated part of policy making in representative democracies. Horizontal forms of inter-
governmental policy making bring together governments placed at the same level of 
governance. Nation states have always built alliances with each other, but other levels of 
governance are increasingly doing the same. Big cities in different countries form partnerships 
in a joint effort to reduce global warming (Kern and Bulkeley 2009), and municipalities work 
closely together in order to coordinate their efforts to solve difficult policy problems (Pedersen, 
Sehested and Sørensen 2010). Vertical forms of inter-governmental policy making bring 
together democratically elected representatives from different levels of governance in 
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interactive forms of governance. Decentralized unitary states and federations have always done 
so, but new levels emerge that intensify this activity. Trans-national representative governments 
such as the EU are a case in point, and so is the mushrooming of various democratically elected 
sub-national and sub-local governments such as regional and municipal councils, 
neighbourhood and village councils and schools boards and boards for the elderly. EU 
authorities engage in close dialogue with member states in order to integrate European 
employment policies (Bogason and Zølner 2007), and national, sub-national and sub-local 
governments involve themselves in fierce negotiations over the distribution of budgets and 
responsibilities (Blom-Hansen 2002).  
 The model of representative democracy can be said to suffer from an institutional void 
because it does not give advice regarding how to democratize this kind of inter-governmental 
policy making. This void is a direct consequence of the model’s intra-demos orientation that 
restricts democratic issues to those having to do with how a given People can govern itself 
through the election of a government that makes decisions on behalf of that People. Due to this 
intra-demos perspective, the model has very little to say about how a People and its government 
can interact with other Peoples and governments in a democratic way.  
 The models of representative democracy have particularly little to say about horizontal 
forms of inter-governmental policy making that bring together governments placed at the same 
level of governance. This is equally true with regard to governance processes that bring 
together different international political institutions, different nation states and different sub-
national and sub-local governments. The general tendency in representative democracies to 
treat foreign policy as a specific kind of policy making that need not live up to democratic 
norms and standards such as publicity is a case in point (Connolly 1995, p. 141). However, as 
we shall see later, this tendency to regard democratic norms and standards as irrelevant in 
relation to horizontal forms of inter-governmental policy making reaches far beyond foreign 
policy. It is just as common/clear in the case of inter-municipal policy making.   
 In relation to vertical forms of inter-governmental policy making, federal models of 
representative democracy and decentred unitary state models do offer important insights into 
how inter-governmental policy making between different levels in the political system can be 
democratized. However, these models tend to focus on the formal distribution of power 
between governmental levels and the relationships between each of these levels and the people 
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who elect them. Less attention has, therefore, been directed towards the complex and intense 
interaction between the levels that actually takes place in the governance processes that are 
necessitated by the outspoken interdependencies between them. Accordingly, multi-level 
models of representative democracy have not addressed the question of how to democratize 
vertical instances of inter-governmental policy-making to the degree it might be expected. 
Rather, they have aimed to uncover the impact that different ways of distributing political 
powers between levels have on democracy. The EU has not to the same extent as federal 
political systems and decentred unitary states been able to design and legitimise its political 
structure with reference to the institutional set up and mythical images offered by the model of 
representative democracy. The ongoing dispute about what the EU is and is not means that it 
can neither portray itself as a federation or a confederation. For this reason it might actually 
prove to be the most important source of inspiration for developing a democratic model for 
vertical inter-governmental policy making. Its reliance on inter-governmental policy making is 
clearly stressed in the much cited White Paper on governance (European Commission 2001), 
and the systematic institutionalization of the committee system is a highly interesting laboratory 
for the development of new forms of inter-governmental policy making. Although these 
experiments have not yet led to the development of a model of inter-governmental democracy, 
the intensive debate about democracy in the EU that currently gained momentum among 
researchers and practitioners addresses the question of how to fill the institutional void left by 
the model of representative democracy more directly and focussed than other research fields 
(Bohman 2005; Habermas 2001; Ansell 2000; Benz and Papadopoulos 2006; Jessop 2004). 
Intensified political globalization has pushed the question of how to democratize inter-
governmental policy making further up on the research agenda (Zürn 2000; Holden 2000). The 
same can be said about the many governance reforms that challenge the idea that good 
governance can be obtained through a strict separations of powers and tasks between higher and 
lower levels of governance. Hence, these reforms have given birth to a system of governance in 
which the latter’s autonomy is not given but depends on their ability to meet standards defined 
by the former (Larner and Walters 2004; Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009).  
 In this emerging reality, the institutional void in representative democracy becomes both 
more apparent and more serious. As envisaged by the two empirical case studies outlined 
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below, the need to develop a model of democracy that fills this void is getting more and more 
urgent.   
 
 
3. Empirical manifestations of the institutional void  
Let us take a brief look at the kinds of inter-governmental policy making that take place in 
advanced liberal democracies. A brief presentation of the results of two recent case studies of 
relatively institutionalized inter-governmental policy making illuminates how the void 
manifests itself empirically in actual governance processes. The first study focuses on a 
horizontal inter-governmental policy arena that brings together a number of Danish 
municipalities in joint policy making. The second study illuminates how vertical inter-
governmental policy making is being institutionalized in an EU context. The two studies show 
that inter-governmental policy making integrated, influential and institutionalized aspect of 
public policy making. Moreover, the studies envisage that despite the integrated, influential and 
institutionalized role they play few considerations have been made regarding the implications 
of this form of policy making for democracy.   
 
Inter-municipal policy making in Denmark  
A reform of the Danish political system that took place in 2007 has triggered an increase in 
horizontal inter-governmental policy making between the municipalities in each of five new 
regions. Although one of the defined goals of the reform was to reduce this kind of inter-
municipal collaboration by making larger municipalities that could manage things by 
themselves the opposite happened. A simultaneous decentralization of a large number of 
governance tasks and the institutionalization of a strict auditing regime triggered an intensive 
battle for power between the state and the municipalities. The new governance tasks as well as 
the intensive battle for power enhanced the feeling of interdependency between the 
municipalities and gave them an incentive to collaborate.  
 Although Danish municipalities already worked together before 2007, the reform initiated a 
formalization and intensification of the inter-municipal collaboration though the formation of a 
Municipal Contact Council (MCC) in each region. These new MCCs are composed of the 
Mayors and a selected number of political leaders from the opposition parties. A study of the 
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activities in the MCC in Region Zealand over a three year period from early 2007 to the end of 
2009 shows how the Council is gradually becoming an integrated and still more 
institutionalized, influential and well-functioning arena for inter-municipal policy making1. It is 
not least a result of skilful metagovernance performed by the National Association of Danish 
Municipalities, and a hard working and ambitious chair with the ability to moderate the many 
conflicts that occur between the municipalities along the way.  
 It is noteworthy that although the MCC in Region Zealand has become a fully accepted, 
highly institutionalized and politically powerful player on the regional political scene, it has not 
been constructed as a democratic arena that needs to live up to particular democratic norms and 
standards. Few questions have been raised about the democratic functioning and legitimacy of 
the Council by those who participate in it or by politicians or other actors who do not, and the 
issue has not been addressed by metagovernors. The involved actors have been more concerned 
about how to strengthen the ability of the MCC to make joint decisions that address pressing 
governance problems and enhance the willingness of the municipalities to stick together in 
order to develop and realize joint policy strategies.  
 Some members of the MCC do, however, find it difficult to operate in the interface between 
their respective municipal councils and the MCC and search for ways to link and balance the 
policy making that goes on in the two arenas. Moreover, many municipal politicians point out 
that although they fully accept the need for an MCC, they do not feel sure about what role it is 
playing and should play in the policy process and how it affects the policy making that takes 
place in the individual municipal councils.   
 
 
Multi-level policy making in EU 
The EU has developed several interesting institutional mechanisms that bring EU authorities  
and representatives from the member states together in processes of joint policy making. The 
‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) is one of them. The OMC is a method for joint policy 
                                                 
1
 The case study was carried out by a group of researchers within the Centre of Democratic Network Governance 
at Roskilde University, and was financed by the Moms-Foundation. Over a period of three years around 50 
interviews were made with politicians, administrators and other actors involved in regional policy making in 
Region Zealand, and more than 30 observations of meetings and events were made. The full presentation of the 
results of the study is available in Pedersen, A., K. Sehested, and E. Sørensen (eds). 2010. Offentlig styring som 
pluricentrisk koordination. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishers. 
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making in the EU in policy areas where the EU does not have decision making powers. It is 
particularly interesting in this context because it lays out a procedure for the formulation and 
implementation of joint policy programmes between autonomous but interdependent 
governments that are placed at different levels in a multi-level governance structure such as the 
EU (Ansell 2000; Bohman 2005; Jessop 2004; Peters and Pierre 2004). A series of case studies 
of the functioning of the OMC process within the field of European employment policy from 
2003-2009 show how employment policy in Europe is being formulated and implemented in 
complex inter-governmental policy processes that involves EU authorities, and national (and 
sub-national) governments2.  
 A cornerstone in the OMC process consists in the formulation of a set of policy guidelines 
that national governments should follow in their formulation and implementation of national 
employment policies. These guidelines are formulated by EMCO that is composed of 
representatives from the European Commission, the member states and different stakeholders 
(Torfing 2007, p. 43). National governments are regularly asked to report how they are 
responding to these guidelines, and meetings are held between the commission and the national 
governments in order to evaluate the national policy outcomes and discuss national policy 
strategies for the future.  
 The case studies indicate that the ongoing dialogue between the European Commission and 
the national governments plays an important role in developing and implementing a European 
employment policy. This is among other things a result of skilful metagovernance. The 
commission make use of a variety of soft forms of governance such as ‘naming and shaming’ 
events and bench marking schemes in order to put pressure on the member states to take the 
guidelines into account. Moreover, the studies show that the involved actors mainly view the 
OMC process as a managerial and none-political process that can safely be left in the hands of 
public administrators from the commission and the member states. Considerations about the 
democratic functioning and legitimacy of the OMC process seem of limited interest to them, 
                                                 
2
 The case studies were carried out by researchers at the Centre for Democratic Network Governance at Roskilde 
University. It was financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council. Over a period of six years and 
involved the collection of more than 50 interviews with politicians, public administrators and other actors involved 
in the OMC process at different levels. Furthermore, a social network analysis and intensive document studies 
were made. The analysis of the case studies can be viewed in full length in P. Bogason and M. Zølner (eds). 2007. 
Methods in Democratic Network Governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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and no attempts have been made to meta-govern the OMC process in a way that address 
democratic issues.  
 This is noteworthy in light of the fact that the EU faces serious legitimacy problems. These 
problems manifest themselves, among other things, when EU citizens turn their backs to new 
treaties, and when the European Parliament and others claim that EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit. Although the European Commission as early as the ‘White Paper on Governance’ 
(2001) introduced the thought that inter-governmental policy making like the one that takes 
place in the OMC process could add to the enhancement of EUs legitimacy, no considerations 
have been made about the degree to which a democratization of inter-governmental processes 
such as the OMC could help to reduce EUs democratic deficit.  
 
The two case studies show that the presence of horizontal and vertical forms of inter-
governmental policy making is fully accepted as an integrated element in governance processes. 
They are viewed as necessary for the successful governance of complex policy problems that 
affect citizens in more than one demos. Strikingly, the studies also show that few questions are 
being asked regarding the democratic implications of these instances of inter-governmental 
policy making. As suggested earlier, one reason for this might be that these bodies have not 
been constructed as democratic arenas. Due to the hegemonic position of the model of 
representative democracy, considerations regarding the democratic functioning and legitimacy 
of particular policy processes only seem relevant in situations that fit into the institutional and 
mythical set up outlined by this model. In municipalities as well as in the EU, considerations 
about the democratic character of decision making processes only seem relevant if these 
processes are recognizable as democratic arenas i.e. municipal councils and the European 
Parliament.  
 Efforts to pave the way for a debate about the democratic functioning and legitimacy of 
concrete processes of inter-governmental policy making must, therefore, start out by 
constructing inter-governmental policy arenas such as the MCCs and OMC as democratic 
arenas that must function and be legitimized according to a hegemonic democratic myth. The 
next step consists in outlining the features and contributions of these particular kinds of 
democratic arenas and the role they are to play in an extended model of representative 
democracy.  
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4. Theorical responses to globalization and new forms of governance  
Within the social sciences there is a growing recognition of the inability of the traditional model 
of representative democracy to give answers to the question of how to ensure democracy in 
light of an increasing globalization and a growth in new forms of governance.  The current 
challenges to democracy highlighted by globalization have been directly addressed by the 
proponents of a cosmopolitan democracy that argue for the establishment of transnational 
political and legal institutions authorized to govern the world community (Held 1995). This 
solution is problematic for two reasons. First, it seems unrealistic to make it happen in a 
foreseeable future. The hardships that the UN, EU and other transnational political institutions 
face in their efforts to play the role of regional or world government are cases in point. 
Democratically authorized transnational political institutions do indeed have an important role 
to play but the willingness to leave political power in the hands of these institutions have 
proven to be limited. Second, a cosmopolitan democracy does not fully address the fact that 
even if transnational political institutions could be authorized, we could not do without inter-
governmental policy making. The complexity, dynamism, and diversity of the policy problems 
that governments must be able to address a call for flexible and situated forms of inter-
governmental policy making that bring together the most intensely affected governments and 
those who have the resources that are relevant for solving the particular kinds of problems in 
question in ad hoc processes of inter-governmental policy making (Kooiman 1993; Elsig 2007). 
While cosmopolitan democracy highlights the need to establish trans-national democratically 
appointed governments, it leaves the question of how to democratize inter-governmental policy 
making unanswered.  
 Critics of cosmopolitan democracy such as James Bohman argue that an authorization of 
transnational political institutions to exercise rule by law is problematic because inter-
governmental policy making - or what he calls ‘inter-demoi’ collaboration – should be based on 
non-domination in order not to undermine the fundamental democratic right of a demos to 
govern itself (Bohman 2005, p. 305). Hence, Bohman seems to view political domination 
within a demos more democratically acceptable with in a demos than beyond it. Although Held 
and Bohman hold different views regarding the degree to which transnational political bodies 
should be able to impose particular policies on national demoi, they both cling to the intra-
demos perspective on democracy. Legitimate democratic rule is exercised by an elected 
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government over the people who elected it. Seen from this perspective, efforts to cope with 
globalization leave us with a choice between transnational legal rule and voluntarism.  
 Other contributions to the debate on the relationship between new forms of governance and 
democracy are more helpful in answering the question about how to democratize inter-
governmental policy making. Paul Hirst (2000) and Archon Fung and Eric Olin Wright (2003) 
have pointed out how interactive governance arenas that bring together governments at 
different levels in the political system can promote democracy by improving the exchange of 
information between them, and Manfried Elsig (2007) shows how interactive governance 
arenas that bring together national governments, such as the WTO, are able to position 
themselves as legitimate arenas for inter-demoi policy making.  
 By bringing together this line of thinking with some of the main arguments in Mark 
Granovetter’s social network analysis, I shall argue that governance networks have the potential 
to become an important arena for inter-governmental policy making because they provide an 
institutional set up and a mythical framework that supports the establishment of weak ties 
between governments: governance networks bring autonomous actors together in a way that 
promotes their ability and willingness to pursue shared goals. Hence, governance networks can 
be defined as a relatively stable regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary institutional 
arena in which interdependent but operationally autonomous actors define and pursue shared 
goals on the basis of self-regulated negotiations.  
 As pointed out in the governance literature, governance networks have proven to be an 
effective institutional platform for promoting inter-governmental policy making. Among other 
things this effectiveness pertains to the fact that governance networks neither rely on the 
exercise of authoritative power nor on voluntarism. Their effectiveness is a result of the 
presence of a strong feeling of interdependency between the involved stakeholders that can be 
said to force them to pursue joint goals on a voluntary basis (Elsig 2007; Slaughter 2003).  
 However, although governance networks are increasingly viewed as an effective means to 
promote joint policy making among autonomous actors such as democratically elected 
governments, they have not gained reputation for being democratic. As noted earlier, there is an 
ongoing debate among governance theorists concerning the democratic implications of the 
widespread use of governance networks as a means to promote public governance. The debate 
points out pros and cons. On the positive side counts that governance networks make it possible 
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to involve those who are most intensely affected by a particular decision directly in the policy 
making (Dryzek 2007; Young 2000; Rhodes, 2000) and train the participants in constructing a 
sense of communality or shared destiny that encourages the formulation of shared goals while 
respecting the presence of difference (Sørensen and Torfing 2003). On the negative side counts 
that there is a propensity to include strong actors who possess resources that others need 
(Hansen 2007) and difficulties in holding decision makers to account due to the informal 
character of many governance networks (Pierre and Peters 2005).  
 Governance researchers have, however, primarily discussed the democratic implications of 
governance networks that bring together public authorities and private stakeholders. Therefore, 
democratic concerns have been particularly salient: How is it possible to democratize 
governance networks in which some of the participants are not democratically elected? In the 
case of inter-governmental governance networks, the network participants are all 
democratically elected governments. This does not diminish the democratic challenges that 
need to be considered, but it means that the focus of attention can be concentrated on how 
governance networks consisting of operationally autonomous but mutually interdependent 
governments can add to the democratization of the considerable and still growing amount of 
inter-governmental policy making. Translated into this context, the pros and cons highlighted in 
the governance debate point out that whether or not governance networks can be said to add to 
the democratization of inter-governmental policy making depends on whether they de facto: 1) 
diffuse influence to the intensely affected governments and not only to those with most 
resources; 2) develop a sense of shared destiny within the networks that perceive difference to 
be a constitutive condition for defining shared goals; and 3) diffuse information in ways that 
enhance the ability of the participants to hold each other to account. I shall return to how this 
can be done in the section on meta-governance. First, however, we must consider in more depth 
why governance networks are particularly relevant as a tool for democratization of inter-
governmental policy making. 
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5. The potential role of governance networks in democratizing inter-governmental 
decision making  
As suggested above governance networks are promising as a tool for democratizing inter-
governmental policy making because they offer an institutional set up and a myth that does not 
undermine but supplement and refine the model of representative democracy. Networks provide 
an institutional arena and a myth that construct inter-governmental policy making as a process 
in which operationally autonomous, but interdependent democratically appointed governments 
collaborate without undermining the close democratic ties that they have to their respective 
constituencies. Therefore, governance networks appear as a relatively unproblematic way of 
filling the institutional void in representative democracy.  
 It should be stressed, however, that although governance networks can supplement 
representative democracy, the kind of democratic arena they provide is radically different form 
that characterizing representative democracy. Accordingly, they should not be measured by the 
same standards. While the democratic quality of governments rely on the degree to which they 
have close ties to their constituencies, the democratic quality of governance networks has to do 
with their ability to form weak ties between governments. In line with Granovetter’s arguments, 
one could say that the particular democratic contribution of governance networks has to do with 
their ability to establish weak ties between strong ties. The model of representative democracy 
views democracy as an intra-demos arena that provides strong institutional and mental ties 
between the government and the People. Institutionally, the model points to the need for strong 
control and accountability mechanisms capable of guaranteeing a high degree of interaction and 
congruence between the views of the people and decisions made by the government. Mentally, 
it draws an image of the demos as an undivided collective political identity. In contrast, 
governance networks are constituted on weak institutional and mental ties that take their 
departure in the fact that the participating actors are committed elsewhere and should be 
allowed to maintain this commitment.  
 Then, what is the particular democratic value of the kind of weak ties between governments 
provided by governance networks? First of all, governance networks make it possible to diffuse 
political influence more directly with reference to levels of affectedness. Hence, the democratic 
legitimacy of governance networks depends on the degree to which their members are 
recognized as representatives for demoi who are intensely affected by the policy problems that 
 15
is being addressed by the network. To put it differently, governance networks pave the way for 
a flexible, situated and problem driven composition of inter-governmental democratic arenas 
that bring political influence into the hands of those governments who are most intensely 
affected. A further positive effect of introducing flexible and problem-driven inter-
governmental governance arenas is a politicization of the question of who should be excluded 
and who should not. If pressure is put on inter-governmental governance networks to legitimize 
their position as influential policy makers on the grounds that they can be said to include the 
intensely affected governments, it is likely that the same kind of pressure to actively consider 
existing patterns of political inclusion and exclusion will increase within the individual demos. 
The following destabilization and re-politicization of well-consolidated patterns of exclusion 
and inclusion within the individual demoi can be seen as positive for democracy because it 
widens the range of issues that can be made subject to political contestation within 
representative democracies (Dryzek 2000).   
 Second, governance networks pave the way for the construction of a particular pluricentric 
kind of democratic communality between actors who subscribe to different collective political 
identities (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004). The significance of governance networks is that 
their ability to function well does not depend on the existence of a collective political identity. 
Rather, they rely on a specific kind of story telling that stipulates the existence of a strong 
interdependency and shared destiny between different collective political identities, and how 
this situation calls for shared action (Sørensen and Torfing 2003). In other words, governance 
networks are held together by policy related story lines (Hajer 1995) that produce a situated and 
dynamic ‘we’ that functions as a shared point of political identification between actors that 
subscribe to a fragmented plurality of democratic communalities. These points of political 
identification are particularly valuable for democracy because they train the participants in what 
Michael Sandel describes as the distinctive civic virtue of our time which is ‘the capacity to 
negotiate our way among sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim 
us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise. This capacity is difficult to 
sustain for it is easier to live with the plurality between persons than within them’ (Sandel 1996, 
p. 350). Governance networks provide arenas that place governments in situations where they 
must deal with these tensions between loyalties just as they offer a way to do so in a legitimate 
way. The necessity and legitimacy are founded on story lines that stipulate the existence of a 
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high degree of interdependency between the involved governments, and draws a mythical 
image of networking as a negotiated process that makes it possible to pursue shared goals 
without undermining the autonomy of the involved demoi. By serving as a platform for coping 
with multiple and overlapping points of identification and the tensions that these complex 
obligations produce, governance networks have a central role to play in paving the way for the 
formation of a pluricentric communality that allows for the construction of  situated and 
temporal collective political identities. This kind of communality is not only important for 
democracy because it allows for the establishment of an inter-demoi ‘we’ that can set the 
agenda for the identification of shared political goals. It can pave the way for a destabilization 
and reshuffling of sedimented ‘we’ and ‘they’ relations within the individual demoi. Although 
such stabilizations are necessary for democracy they are also dangerous because they tend to 
block a permanent vibrant political contestation about what characterizes this ‘we’ and who and 
what it includes. By bringing different and partly overlapping notions of political communality 
into dialogue with each other, and by training governments to shift between different points of 
identification, governance networks encourage self-reflection and political debate about the 
character the political communality that forms the basis of a demos, and softens the boundaries 
between the included and the excluded. Thereby, governance networks help to reduce the 
totalizing tendencies that are inherent to the construction of strong collective identities 
(Connolly 1995).  
   Finally, the weak inter-governmental ties provided by governance networks can be of great 
value to democracy because of their capacity to ensure an effective diffusion of political 
information. Hence, governance networks establish an environment in which governments can 
exchange information about facts, views and ideas and diffuse this knowledge to their 
respective constituencies. It can be argued that the involved governments might chose to keep 
this information to themselves but the fact that the ties between the participants are weak makes 
it notoriously difficult for the participants to keep the aggregated information within the 
network. This incontrollable and extensive and far reaching diffusion of influence does not only 
increase the ability of the involved constituencies to hold inter-governmental governance 
networks to account for their actions. It also improves chances that the control and 
accountability mechanisms provided by the institutions of representative will be able to hold 
their promises. Representative democracy provides a series of mechanisms for diffusing 
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political information to the citizens. Different laws grant citizens the right to obtain information 
about the actions taken by politicians and the public administration and the media have 
extended access to key policy arenas. Although these mechanisms for diffusing political 
information are crucial for democracy, inter-governmental governance networks expand the 
level of political information available to decision makers because governance networks 
function as sites for information exchange and information aggregation. Furthermore, inter-
governmental governance networks can help to destabilize well-established alliances between 
powerful elites and hegemonic policy discourses that lay the ground for asymmetrical 
distributions of political power in representative democracies (Connolly 1995, p. 24). This 
ability to diffuse political information in ways that reduce the chances of closure makes inter-
governmental governance networks a valuable means to supplement and refine the control and 
accountability mechanisms provided by the institutions of representative democracy.  
Having now outlined the potential role that inter-governmental governance networks can 
play in supplementing and refining representative democracy, it should immediately be stressed 
that this potential is not released automatically. If governance networks are to serve this 
function they must be actively constructed as democratic arenas through deliberate and strategic 
acts of metagovernance. 
 
6. Promoting the democratic capacity of governance networks through 
metagovernance  
If inter-governmental governance networks are to serve as democratic arenas, they must be put 
under pressure to justify and legitimize their actions with reference to democratic norms and 
standards. More precisely, they must be able to show that they distribute influence with 
reference to levels of affectedness, provide a sense of shared destiny or communality 
constituted on the presence of plural collective points of identification, and diffuse political 
information in ways that promote the ability of the participating governments and the affected 
constituencies to hold the governance network to account. 
 Due to the self-governing character of governance networks, the pressure on them to live up 
to these standards must necessarily be brought about by means of different forms of 
metagovernance. There is no over-aching point from where governance networks can be 
controlled and directed. Does this mean that it is impossible to govern governance networks? 
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No, but it means that governance networks must be governed in ways that grant them a 
considerable space for self-governance. Using the vocabulary provided by governance theory, 
governance networks must be metagoverned, which is defined as the governance of self-
governance (Jessop 1998, 2003; Kooiman 2003; Meuleman, 2008; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). 
It must be said that there is an intensive debate about the forms of metagovernance that can be 
exercised through an institutional framing of governance networks. But what institutional 
framing means depends heavily on what is meant by an institution. Governance theorists tend to 
leave a traditional institutionalism behind and downgrade the importance of formal institutional 
rules and procedures. Instead they take their point of departure form different neo-institutional 
approaches (Sørensen and Torfing 2007, p. 30). Governance theorists who take their departure 
from a logic of consequentiality view institutions as incentives structures that motivate self-
governing actors to act in particular ways (Scharpf 1994; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997) 
while those who subscribe to institutional approaches that take their departure from a logic of 
appropriateness view institutions as universes of meaning that form the identities and 
subjectivities of the involved actors (March and Olsen 1995; Foucault 1991). As such, the 
institutional framing of governance networks points to the construction of incentives and 
meaning structures that motivate and guide self-governing actors to follow a designated 
direction defined by a meta-governor. In the metagovernors tool kit we find grant based funding 
schemes, performance based resource allocation, naming and shaming events and story telling. 
 The debate on the problems and potentials of metagovernance as a means of governing 
networks has been closely connected to considerations about the role of the state. Accordingly, 
the role of meta-governor has more or less explicitly been viewed as a task to be performed by 
a step higher authority with the resources that this position entails. However, as pointed out by 
some (Kooiman 1993; Jessop 1998) metagovernance can be exercised by a wide range of 
actors. This view is supported by Christopher Hood (1986) who argues the capacity to govern 
society can be performed by any political actor who has the nodality, authority, treasure and 
organizational capacity to do so. In the case of meta-governance, it could be added that actors 
who are able to activate one or more of these capacities in ways that add to the formation of a 
desired institutional framing of inter-governmental governance networks can increase the 
pressure on these networks to legitimize themselves with reference to particular democratic 
norms and standards. Strong political movements can do so, the media can do so, strong 
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governments can do so and organized interests can do, and the research community can do so. 
Whether these actors chose to use their resources as metagovernors to enhance the democratic 
quality of inter-governmental governance networks is another matter. They can but it is not 
certain that they will.   
 
7. Conclusion  
The aim of the article has been to show how governance theory and social network analysis 
provide important insights which can help to point out the particular role that governance 
networks have to play in democratizing the surging amount of horizontal and vertical forms of 
inter-governmental policy making. Governance theory categorizes governance networks as a 
particular institutional arena that enhances the capacity of interdependent but operationally 
autonomous governments to pursue shared goals, and point out how the democratic potential of 
governance networks can be promoted through metagovernance. Social network analysis 
highlights that the particular democratic potential of inter-governmental governance networks 
has to do with the fact that they establish weak democratic ties between governments 
constituted on strong democratic ties to their constituencies. Thereby, social network analysis 
helps to clarify that the democratic value of governance networks has to do with the fact that it 
provides a particular kind of democratic institutionalization that can both supplement and refine 
representative democracy: they can democratize inter-demoi policy making and enhance the 
level of political contestation within the individual demos through a destabilization of 
sedimented power structures.  
 There are definitely other important routes to take in our current efforts to deal with the 
serious challenges that face democracy in the light of political globalization and new forms of 
governance. We need to follow them all. The formation of strong trans-national political 
institutions is an important path to follow, and the many institutional experiments that take 
place in the context of the EU are valuable. However, if these paths should prove to be 
successful we still need to find ways to institutionalize the kind of flexible, situated and 
temporal forms of inter-governmental policy making that are necessary in order to provide 
focussed, problem driven policy making. Although it is not an easy task, we need to develop a 
model of democracy that suggests ways to democratize this kind of policy making.  
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 It might be argued that it is problematic to expect governance networks to serve as a means 
to improve democracy in light of the many criticisms that have been raised against them for 
being a threat to democracy. I do not deny these criticisms, but I claim that they are not intrinsic 
to governance networks. Social network analysis indicates that governance networks do in fact 
enhance inclusion, social cohesion and accountability due to their reliance on weak ties. In my 
view, the democratic problems pertaining to governance networks have to do with the fact that 
they have until now not been perceived as democratic arenas. As the two empirical cases 
illustrate that even though governance networks have become an integrated and 
institutionalized governance practise, they are not expected to live up to democratic norms and 
standards. I can think of two reasons why they are not viewed as democratic arenas. First, 
governance theory has approached governance networks from a managerial perspective 
focussing on the extent to which they contribute to the provision of effective public governance. 
Second, the hegemonic position of the traditional intra-demos myth has placed inter-
governmental policy making outside the realm of democratic decision making. If, however, 
governance networks were viewed as democratic arenas their full democratic potentials could 
be released. They will be able to provide a high level of input legitimacy obtained through the 
diffusion of influence to affected stakeholders, a high degree of with-input legitimacy through 
the construction of a pluricentric communality that makes it possible for the involved 
governments to define and pursue joint objectives, and a considerable amount of output 
legitimacy brought about by the diffusion of information about the actions of the governance 
network that makes it possible for the public to hold it to account.  
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